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POLICIES AFFECTING INDONESIA’S INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
1 
 
                             by 
 
                         THEE Kian Wie
2 
                         
   
Indonesia's industrial development before and after the Asian 
economic crisis: an overview 
 
                                                                
a. Industrial development during the Soeharto era 
 
During the 32 years of 'New Order' rule (1966-98) the Indonesian 
economy experienced rapid and sustained growth, which enabled 
Indonesia to graduate from the ranks of one of the poorest low 
income countries in the mid-1960s to one of the eight 'high-
performing Asian economies' (HPAEs) in the early 1990s, along with 
Japan, the four 'Asian Tigers', and Indonesia's two Southeast 
Asian neighbours, Malaysia and Thailand (World Bank 1993: 1, 37). 
With the economy growing at an average annual rate of 7.0 per cent 
over the period 1965-97, Indonesia's real gross national product 
roughly doubled every 10 years over this period. 
 
Rapid economic growth during this period was driven by the 
expansion of the three main sectors of the economy, namely 
agriculture, manufacturing, and services.  As the manufacturing 
sector throughout this period was growing at double digits, much 
faster than the two other sectors which were growing at single 
digits, the Indonesian economy also underwent a rapid 
transformation, as reflected by the rapid decline in the relative 
importance of agriculture in the economy and an equally rapid rise 
in relative importance of the manufacturing sector (Table 1).  In 
fact, by 1991 manufacturing's contribution to GDP had exceeded the 
contribution of the agricultural sector (Aswicahyono 1997: 25).  
 
Table 1 Economic growth and transformation in Indonesia, 1965-1997 
 
                     
1 Draft paper prepared for the Conference on Technology and Long-
Run Economic Growth in Asia, to be held at Hitotsubashi 
University, Tokyo, 8-9 September 2005. 
2  Senior Economist, Economic Research Centre,Indonesian 
Institute of Sciences (P2E-LIPI), Jakarta, and currently Visiting 











         Average annual growth rate(%)        % of GDP 
 
 
 1965-80  1980-90  1990-97    1965    1997 
GDP     7.0    6.1      7.7     
Agricultur
e 
   4.3   3.4      2.8      51     16 
Industry    11.9    6.9      9.9     13    43 
Manufact
uring 
  12.0  12.6    10.8       8    26 
Services      7.3    7.0    7.2     36   41 
 
  Source: 1.  For period 1965-80: World Bank: World Development Report 1992, Oxford 
                         University Press, 1992, table 2, p. 220; table 3, p. 222;   
For periods 1980-1990 and 1990-1996: World Development Indicators 1999,  Development 
Data Center, table 4.1, p. 189; table 4.2, p. 193. 
 
After Indonesia in the mid-1980s shifted to export-promoting 
policies after the end of the oil boom made a continuation of 
import-substituting industrialisation no longer feasible, it was   
able to achieve a rapid growth of its manufactured exports, and 
thereby decrease its traditional dependence on primary exports, 
particularly oil and gas exports.  For this reason the World Bank 
study on 'The East Asian Miracle' classified Indonesia as one of 
the three East Asian 'newly-industrializing economies' (NIEs) 
along with Malaysia and Thailand (World Bank 1993).          
      
During the late 1960s and early 1970s Indonesia's rapid industrial 
growth was initially fuelled by the liberalisation of economic 
policies, particularly the liberalization of the trade and foreign 
investment regimes, and the return to normal economic conditions 
after the political turmoil and economic chaos of the early 1960s. 
During the oil boom period (1974-81) rapid industrial growth was 
also facilitated by the import-substituting policies which enabled 
domestic producers and foreign investment projects to replace 
imported light consumer goods and consumer durables. 
 
However, during the oil boom era the liberal economic policies 
were largely replaced by more interventionist policies, as the 
Indonesian government, flush with windfall revenues from the oil 
booms, initiated an ambitious, second phase import-substituting, 
state-led industrialization after the 'easy' phase of import-











1979: 13).  This second phase of import-substituting 
industrialization largely involved the establishment of various 
upstream, state-owned, resource-based basic industries.  
       
Even though many Indonesian and foreign economists were highly 
critical of this costly and inefficient pattern of import-
substituting industrialization, which largely ignored comparison 
of production costs with border prices (Gray 1982: 41), the large 
oil boom revenues enabled the Indonesian government to ignore 
their warnings. However,  by 1983 the end of the oil boom forced 
the Indonesian government to shift to export-promoting policies by 
introducing a series of deregulation measures to improve the 
investment climate for private, including foreign, investors to 
encourage them to invest in export-oriented projects. The 
government also introduced a series of trade reforms to reduce the 
'anti-export bias' of the highly protectionist trade regime.  A 
significant step in the direction of encouraging an export-
promoting path of industrialization was the introduction in May 
1986 of a 'duty exemption and drawback scheme' which provided 
export-oriented firms with the opportunity to purchase inputs, 
whether actually imported or locally made, at international prices. 
 This scheme turned out to be a crucial factor in facilitating the 
ensuing rapid growth of manufactured exports.             
The various deregulation measures, including trade reforms and the 
reintroduction of more liberal foreign investment policies, 
combined with a supportive exchange rate policy aimed at keeping 
the real effective exchange rate at a competitive level, and 
facilitated by sound macroeconomic policies, proved to be   
successful as the manufacturing sector since 1987 generated a 
rapid surge in manufactured exports. This surge was remarkable, 
since it was the first broad-based expansion of manufactured 
exports in Indonesia's modern economic history (Hill 1987: 29).  
 
As a result of the surge in manufactured exports, Indonesia's 
manufacturing sector, specifically the non-oil and gas 
manufacturing sub-sector, since the mid-1980s emerged as the   
country's major engine of economic growth  (World Bank 1994: 1).  
During the period 1985-88 the manufacturing sector grew at an 
average annual rate of 13 per cent, while manufactured exports 
grew at an average annual rate of 27 per cent.  During the period 
1989-92 the manufacturing sector surged at a much faster rate of 
22 per cent, while manufactured exports continued to grow at an 
average of 27 per cent (Dhanani 2000: 28).  
 











the manufacturing sector slowed down to an average 12 per cent, as 
the growth of manufactured exports grew only at a sluggish 7 per 
cent (Dhanani 2000: 28).  One major reason why the growth rates 
were high was that they started from a low base (HIID 1995: 1).  
 
Nevertheless, the concern of policy-makers and academic economists 
alike about the slowdown in the growth of manufactured exports 
since 1993 was understandable, as it was feared that a sluggish 
growth of manufactured exports would adversely affect the 
prospects of continued rapid economic growth, which for the period 
of the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan (1994/95-1998/99) was 
projected at 6-7 per cent per annum.  In their view, Indonesia 
could not continue to rely on its traditional resource- and low 
skill labour-intensive manufactured exports due to the rapid 
dwindling of domestic supplies of timber, and the sharp 
competition from lower wage countries.  
 
The slowdown in manufactured export growth since 1993 should not 
have been surprising to Indonesia's policy-makers as the drive to 
introduce further deregulation packages, including trade reforms, 
had since the early 1990s petered out. Despite the stated 
government objective of promoting non-oil and gas exports, 
particularly manufactured exports, the trade regime by 1992 still 
had an 'anti-export bias'.  
 
Concerned about the sustainability of manufactured export growth, 
the Indonesian government commissioned some studies to look into 
this problem. In a study on the 'Prospects for  Manufactured 
Exports During Repelita VI' conducted by the Harvard Institute of 
International Development (HIID) in 1995 for the Department of 
Industry and Trade, the HIID report found that Indonesia was 
behind its international competitors in laying the foundation for 
developing skill- and capital-intensive exports  (HIID 1995: 7).   
Based on the experience of other developing countries, the HIID 
study recommended that Indonesia would have to transform its 
export base, by moving gradually towards the exports of more 
sophisticated manufactures and services. Like these countries, for 
Indonesia the only basis for modernizing the export base was to 
achieve continued gains in the productivity of workers, capital, 
and the firms themselves (HIID 1995: 1). Hence, the challenge 
facing Indonesia's manufacturing sector was to achieve a sustained 
increase in total factor productivity (TFP).  
 
That TFP growth rates in Indonesian manufacturing are greatly 











findings of studies by Hill, Aswicahyono, & Bird; and Timmer on 
TFP growth in Indonesian manufacturing during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Table 2). 
 
Table 2  Average annual TFP growth in Indonesian manufacturing,  
         1975-95  
          
 Period 
Average annual 
TFP growth (%) 
     (1)  
  Period  Average  annual 
TFP growth (%) 
    (2)  
  1976-81       0.7   1975-81        1.0 
  1982-85       1.1    1982-85       0.1  
  1986-91         2.1    1986-90       7.9 
     1991-95      2.1 
     1975-95      2.8 
 
Source:  For (1), Hill, Aswicahyono, and Bird (1997), table 3.8; 
         and for (2) Timmer (1999), table 4, p. 87.    
 
 
Hill’s, Aswicahyono’s and Bird’s study found that TFP growth rates 
in Indonesian manufacturing varied according to three distinct 
policy periods, namely the period of import-substituting 
industrialisation during the oil boom (1976-81),  the immediate 
post-oil boom period when existing policies were reassessed (1982-
85),  and the period marked by a more decisive shift to export-
promotion policies (1986-91).  Average annual TFP`growth was low 
during the first period, then rose during the second period, and 
then rose faster during the third period (Hill, Aswicahyono and 
Bird 1997: 78).  Evidently, the more favourable policy environment 
since the mid-1980s had a positive impact on TFP growth.  
 
A more recent study by Marcel Timmer on aggregate TFP growth in 
Indonesian manufacturing came up`with largely similar findings. 
Subdividing the period studied into five-year intervals, Timmer 
found, like Hill.`et.al., that average annual TFP growth rate was 
low during the import-substituting phase of the late 1970s-early 
1980s. However, after the policy reforms introduced since the mid-
1980s TFP growth accelerated steeply in the late 1980s (Timmer, 
1999: 84-7). During the first half of the 1990s, however, declined 
again, although it was still higher than during the import-
substitution phase of the late 1970s-early 1980s.         
 
Based on the experience of the successful Asian newly-











following core elements of a strategy for developing Indonesia's  
manufactured exports, namely deepening the export base, 
particularly by increasing the  domestic content of exports;       
expanding the number of exporting firms; y encouraging firms         
oriented towards the domestic market to start exporting; and       
building a base for more sophisticated exports, by developing         
the  capacity  of  manufacturing  firms  to  acquire,  adapt,  and        
build on new, imported technologies. Developing these         
technological  capabilities  would  need  government  support,      
particularly in ensuring that the necessary scientific and           
engineering skills are available, in strengthening quality         
control efforts and in ensuring that property rights are duly 
protected (HIID 1995: 5-7).  
      
Despite the soundness of these recommendations, the government had 
on the eve of the Asian economic crisis not yet completed the 
necessary deregulation of international trade, including further 
tariff reductions and relaxation of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), 
which would have reduced the production costs of manufacturing 
firms and raised their international competitiveness (World Bank 
1997: 112).  In addition, extensive regulations and restrictions 
on domestic competition also added to the costs of doing business 
in Indonesia, thereby further reducing the efficiency of private 
firms (World Bank 1997: 118).         
 
One major reason why the Indonesian government had by 1997 not yet 
taken the necessary steps, obvious to economists, to further 
deregulate international trade and lift the policy-generated 
barriers to domestic competition, was the influence of Dr. B.J. 
Habibie, the powerful Minister of State for Research and 
Technology.  Unlike most economists, Habibie, an aeronautic 
engineer by training, held that Indonesia should no longer depend 
on labour-intensive industries, which in his view were 'sunset 
industries', the international competitiveness of which were 
declining (Thee 1998: 33).  To compensate for the decline of these 
'sunset industries', Habibie instead promoted the development of 
'strategic industries', particularly the state-owned, 'hi-tech' 
aircraft industry, which in his view would yield considerably more 
foreign exchange earnings than the 'sunset industries'.  To 
develop these 'strategic industries', these industries needed to 
be temporarily protected and subsidised (Thee 1998: 133). 
 
Habibie's views on promoting costly 'strategic    industries' were 
strongly criticized by economists, since these industries were 











high protection, assured government procurement, monopolistic 
position, and huge explicit and implicit subsidies, without a 
reasonable prospect of them becoming commercially viable in the 
foreseeable future (Thee 1998:  134).  However, because of 
Habibie's strong influence on President Soeharto, his views 
prevailed in spite of the reservations of Indonesia's economic 
technocrats.  Hence, during the 1990s up to the crisis of 1997/98 
the Indonesian government pursued a 'dual track' industrialization 
strategy by pursuing both the 'broad spectrum' policy of outward-
looking industrialization, as advocated by a more export-oriented 
Department of Industry and Trade, and the promotion of the costly 
'strategic industries' as  promoted by Habibie and his fellow 
'technologists' (Thee & Pangestu 1998: 262).  
 
     
b.  Industrial development after the Asian economic crisis  
 
After the onset of the Asian economic crisis, growth of 
Indonesia’s manufacturing sector slowed down sharply.  While 
manufacturing in 1996 grew at almost 12 percent, it slowed  to 5.3 
percent in 1997 and in 1998 contracted by  -11.4 percent.  (Table 
3) 
  
Table 3  Growth of Indonesia’s GDP and Manufacturing Sector,  













2003   2004 
GDP 4.7 -
13.1 





3.9 6.0 3.1 3.4 3.5 7.2 














3.5 7.0 4.0 3.7 3.8 8.7 
 
Source:  Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS), Jakarta. 
 
 
Although manufacturing growth recovered to a sluggish 3.9 percent 











through 2003.  However, in 2004 it rose sharply to 7.2 per cent in 
line with more rapid economic growth. 
    
To some extent, the sluggish growth of manufacturing after 2000 
was due to the lower output of the oil and gas industries, 
specifically the petroleum refineries.  Growth of the oil and gas 
industries in 2000 and  2001 was negative, and very sluggish since 
2002. Hence, lower output of the oil and gas manufacturing sub-
sector adversely affected the growth of total manufacturing output 
 (MacIntyre and Resosudarmo, 2003: 139-40).  However, it should be 
borne in mind that the relative importance of the oil and gas 
industries after the end of the oil boom era in 1982 has steadily 
declined.  In 2002, the oil and gas manufacturing sub-sector 
accounted for only 11 percent of the non-oil and -gas 
manufacturing sub-sector. 
 
Looking at the performance of the non-oil and -gas industries, 
which generated the bulk of the surge of non-oil exports since the 
late 1980s through 1996,  we see that the growth of the non-oil 
and gas manufacturing sub-sector has also declined steadily from a 
high of 7.0 percent in 2000 to 4.0 percent or less from 2001 
through 2003.  However, in 2004 the non-oil and gas manufacturing 
sub-sector grew at 7.8 per cent, which was the highest rate after 
the crisis. 
 
Although the current prospects for a recovery of the manufacturing 
sector seem slightly better than in the past few years, its 
prospects are still cloudy because of various adverse factors, 
including the continuing rise in wages due to the mandatory 
increases in minimum wages that have become binding in most 
industries; non-wage cost increases caused by  the high 
facilitation costs associated with doing business in Indonesia; 
the absence of technological upgrading; the emergence of strong 
competitors in both the domestic and export markets; and the wide 
prevalence of smuggling, particularly of consumer electronics 
(Kuncoro, 2003: 2).    
 
As a result of the sluggish performance of Indonesia’s 
manufacturing sector, particularly the non-oil and -gas 
manufacturing industries, and the recent relocation of scores of 
FDI-controlled and domestic-controlled plants to other countries 
in the region, including China and Vietnam,  concern has been 
expressed that  Indonesia is facing the danger of ‘de-
industrialization’ if no new substantial FDI and domestic 











government has thus far been unable to improve the country’s poor 
investment climate. 
 
Although Indonesia's rapid industrial growth and transformation 
during the past three decades have undoubtedly been accompanied by 
technological upgrading, as reflected by rising TFP levels (table 
2), particularly since the mid-1980s, the development of 
Indonesia's industrial technological capabilities (ITCs) has 
lagged behind that of the Asian Tigers, particularly Korea and 
Taiwan.  Indonesia's relatively low ITCs have also been confirmed 
by more qualitative firm-level surveys conducted by, amongst 
others, international consulting firms (SRI International, 1992) 
and in a comparative study sponsored by UNCTAD's Technology 
Program on the link between manufactured exports and technological 
capabilities in Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam 
(Ernst, et al., 1998). This comparative study indicated that   
Indonesia's ITCs, even in export-oriented manufacturing firms, 
were still limited to the basic production or operational 
capabilities required for the smooth functioning of the plants and, 
to a lesser extent, to adaptive or minor change capabilities, 
specifically in regard to introducing minor changes in process 
technologies to adapt to local conditions. None of Indonesia’s 
firms, however, had as yet developed the more demanding innovative 
or major change capabilities that enable firms to  make major 
changes in process or product technologies. Development of these 
latter capabilities, the study concluded, was essential to the 
ability of Indonesian firms to achieve and maintain international 
competitiveness (Thee and Pangestu, 1998). 
 
In a critical assessment made in 1998, Sanjaya Lall also pointed 
out the relatively low level of Indonesia’s ITCs. Lall observed 
that Indonesia’s industrial structure had several weaknesses in 
terms of technology.  These weaknesses, if not overcome, would 
hamper Indonesia’s long-term industrial growth and upgrading (Lall, 
1998: 136). Among the technological weaknesses cited were the 
shallow and backward technological base, particularly compared to 
that of the East Asian Tigers; weak and narrow domestic 
capabilities for absorbing and improving upon complex imported 
technologies; an underdeveloped capital goods sector;  and the 
relatively small amount of technological effort, which was 
concentrated and distorted (because of the focus on highly 
subsidized and protected “hi-tech” industries, particularly the 
aircraft assembling industry, promoted by Dr. Habibie, the then 












In the following pages the policies to enhance Indonesia’s 
industrial competitiveness through improved technological 
capabilities will be discussed. 
 
 




International experience, particularly of the East Asian NIEs, has 
indicated that raising Indonesia’s export competitiveness requires 
investments in various kinds of technological capabilities, 
including procurement, production, design, engineering, marketing, 
and other kinds of capabilities (Lall, et.al., 2000: 20).   
Developing these technological capabilities is particularly 
important for raising Indonesia's export competitiveness, as thus 
far its manufactured exports has mainly consisted of resource- and 
low skill labour-intensive products, which generally involve less 
effort, risk, and externalities. On the other hand, rapid and 
sustained manufactured export growth requires moving from easy to 
complex products and processes within activities, and across 
activities from easy to complex technologies (Lall, et.al., 2000: 
20). 
   
 
International experience has shown that an industrial technology 
development strategy requires that certain basic and enabling 
conditions  are  met  or  created  (World  Bank,  1996:2-5).           
     
The  basic  conditions for industrial technology development in 
Indonesia are: 
 
1. The pursuit of sound macroeconomic policies, as low inflation 
encourages firms to make long-term investments in technology 
development; 
 
2. The pursuit of pro-competition economic policies, as a 
competitive environment is conducive to drive firms to rapidly 
adopt, diffuse new technologies, and make an effective choice and 
efficient use of new technologies;   
 
3. The upgrading of the quality of human resources, as the 
technical human resource base is a key input into the process of 
acquiring, using, improving, and developing technologies (World 












In addition to these basic conditions, a number of enabling 
conditions should be met or created through policies that: 
 
1. Improve the manufacturing firms’ access to foreign technologies 
   through foreign direct investment (FDI), technical licensing 
   agreements, capital goods imports, and foreign trade; 
 
2. Improve the availability of adequate finance for techn0ology 
   development; 
 
3. Improve the effectiveness and performance of the technology 
   support services (World Bank, 1996: i). 
 
 




a. The basic conditions 
 
1.  Pursuing sound macroeconomic policies 
 
        From the outset the ‘New Order’ government under General, 
later President Soeharto (1966-98) put a high priority on pursuing 
sound macroeconomic policies. After the reckless deficit-financing 
policies of President Sukarno which led to hyperinflation in the 
mid-1960s, the ‘New Order’ government realized that achieving and 
maintaining macroeconomic stability was crucial to encourage   
firms to undertake the long-term capital investments necessary for 
rapid and sustained economic growth. 
 
Although during the Soeharto era the Indonesian economy 
experienced several major shocks, such as the debt crisis of 
Pertamina, the large state-owned oil company, in early 1995, the 
two oil booms of the 1970s (1973/74 and 1978/79), and the crisis 
caused by the end of the oil boom in 1982, the Indonesian 
government took immediate steps to tackle these shocks and restore 
macroeconomic stability. As a result, during the Soeharto era 
Indonesia’s record on controlling inflation has been fairly good, 
although Indonesia’s inflation during the mid-1980s through the 
mid-1960s was always slightly higher than that of its East Asian 
neighbours, except for the Philippines (Hill, 1996: 7). 
 











because of the Asian financial and economic crisis. As a result of 
the steep depreciation of the rupiah, inflation rose steeply to 80 
per cent in early 1998.  However, in the course of 1998 the 
hyperinflation was gradually brought under control because of 
tight monetary policies.  As a result, inflation flattened out 
quite suddenly, and from late 1998 to mid-1999 inflation dropped 
to only 5.2 per cent (Hill, 1999: 29).           
 
Whatever the political differences between the post-Soeharto 
governments (Habibie, Abdurrachman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri, 
and currently Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono), all these governments 
realized the great importance of sound macroeconomic policies to 
maintain macroeconomic stability.  Under the able stewardship of 
Dr. Boediono, Minister of Finance in the Megawati administration 
(2001-04), macroeconomic stability was strengthened, as reflected 
by a stable inflation rate of 6 per cent in 2004 (World Bank, 
2005: ii). In the last two months inflation rose slightly to 
slightly below the upper bound (6.5 per cent) of the target 
range6.5 per cent set by Bank Indonesia (Soesastro & Atje, 2005: 
19).     
 
 
2. Pursuing pro-competition economic policies 
 
The experience of the East Asian NIEs has shown that a competitive 
environment for firms has been an important prerquisite for 
technology upgrading. In these countries competition has been an 
important stimulus to drive firms to invest in their technological 
development (World Bank, 1996: 3).     
 
The overall competitive environment is determined by the foreign 
trade regime and domestic competition. As noted earlier, the end 
of the oil boom in 1982 forced the ‘New Order’ government to 
introduce a series of deregulation measures, particularly the 
deregulation of the restrictive trade and foreign investment 
regimes.  These policies played an important role in promoting 
industrial technological development by encouraging many firms to 
improve their productivity and efficiency, and product design and 
product quality. However, many other firms were not able or 
willing to improve their technological capabilities, which 
affected adversely their ability to become competitive in the 
export market or even in the domestic markets (World Bank, 1996: 
7). 
 











of trade reforms to reduce the ‘anti-export bias’ of the trade 
regime. These trade reforms included a gradual but steady 
reduction in tariff protection and non-tariff barriers (NTBs), 
specifically quantitative import restrictions, and the above duty 
exemption and drawback scheme for export-oriented firms. However, 
by the time the ‘New Order’ government had introduced its last 
trade reforms in early 1997, remaining import protection still 
accounted for a lower, but still significant ‘anti-export bias’ of 
the trade regime (Thee, 1998:  118-9). 
 
While the trade reforms from the mid-1980s through 1997 did lead 
to greater import competition, domestic competition and trade were 
still subject to extensive regulations and restrictions introduced 
by the central and provincial governments, and occasionally by 
officially sanctioned trade and industry associations (Thee, 2002: 
332). These restrictions took many forms, including entry controls, 
price controls, provisions for public sector dominance, the 
sanctioning of cartels, and ad hoc interventions favouring 
specific firms or sectors (Iqbal, 1995: 14).   
 
Only after the onset of the Asian economic crisis was the 
Indonesian government forced, as part of its first assistance 
agreement with the IMF in early November 1997, to lift the policy-
generated barriers to domestic competition and trade. In its 
second agreement with the IMF in January 1998, a wider range of 
structural reforms were included, which provided for a further 
deregulation of the foreign trade and foreign investment regimes  
as well as the domestic competition regime (Thee, 1998: 332). 
 
Aside from the deregulation policies which were intended to 
promote competition in the local and national markets, in early 
1999 the new Indonesian government under President Habibie enacted 
a competition law, the Law Banning Monopolistic Practices and 
Unfair Competition. This competition law was intended to protect 
and maintain free and open market competition by preventing anti-
competitive business practices by firms. With this competition law, 
Indonesia had in place, at least on paper, a comprehensive 
competition policy, encompassing both the various deregulation 
measures and a competition law (Thee, 1998: 333-4).            
 
Since the appointment of a Business Competition Supervisory 
Commission in late 1996, many cases, particularly bid rigging or 
closed tenders, have already been investigated by this Commission. 
While some of its decisions have been criticized, it has been 











competitive business conduct was suspected. 
 
Unfortunately, the deregulation policies of the recent past have   
been offset by the proliferation of new regulations by local 
governments since decentralisation was introduced in early 2001. 
Many of these regulations restrict or tax trade within or between 
districts (kabupaten) and provinces. Obviously, these taxes and 
restrictions interfere in domestic trade and undermine domestic 
competition and internal market efficiency (World Bank, 2005: 41). 
Hence, in terms of domestic competition, the new restrictions on 
domestic trade and competition have undermined the pro-competition 
policies of recent years.  
 
 
3. Expanding education and upgrading the quality of human 
   resources 
 
A well-trained labour force, an effective training system, good 
quality science and engineering faculties of universities, and 
good management training and development programs are key elements 
for sustaining Indonesia’s industrial technology development 
(World Bank, 1996: ii). However, despite the good progress which 
Indonesia has made during the Soeharto era in expanding education 
at the primary, and to a lesser extent at the secondary and 
tertiary levels, the quality of education and training at all 
levels needs to be raised substantially. 
 
Despite the progress in expanding education during the Soeharto 
era,  Indonesia’s public expenditure on human resource development 
by the end of the 20
th century still ranked below the average low 
income countries (Table 4)   
 
 
Table 4  Indonesia’s human resource development in comparative 
         Perspective, 1999 
 
                
              Public  expenditure  on      Public expenditure on     
                   education                      health       
  % of GNI  Per 
student % of 
GNI per 
capita 
 % of GDP   Per capita 
 PPP $ 
Indonesia    1.4       6    0.7     21 















  4.6     21.2    2.6    144   
 
Source:  World Bank: World Development Indicators, 2001. 
 
In 1995/96, just before the Asian economic crisis, central 
government expenditure on education accounted for 15 per cent of 
total central government expenditure or Rp. 12 trillion in 
absolute terms. However, in 2004 public expenditure on education   
accounted for only 10 per cent of central government expenditure 
or Rp. 25 trillion in absolute terms (Ninasapti, 2005). 
Considering the tight budget caused by the huge amount of foreign 
and domestic debt service payments and the large fuel subsidies, 
there is little possibility that the Indonesian government will be 
able to substantially increase its expenditure on education.     
 
Aside from the fact that Indonesia’s public expenditure on human 
resource development is even lower than the average low income 
country, let alone the average middle income country, the current 
education and training system in general also does not meet the 
needs of industry. The reason is that the general secondary 
education system relies on rote learning, and does not develop 
adequate mastery of basic literacy, basic numeracy, and thinking 
and creative skills. Hence, high school graduates are not 
adequately equipped with the knowledge and skills required for a 
more complex and diversified manufacturing sector,`and also cannot 
take advantage from on-the-job training (Dhanani, 2000: 11).  
 
Moreover, the senior secondary technical vocational schools, two 
thirds of which are privately-funded and –operated, are poorly 
staffed and equipped, and thus do not equip the graduates with 
adequate practical knowledge. Post-secondary vocational technical 
education, on the other hand, is mainly provided by the government 
(Dhanani, 2000: 11), which currently lacks the resources to expand 
education and improve the quality of education, particularly 
technical education.        
  
 
Aside from these basic conditions required to promote industrial 
technology development,  enabling conditions should be in place to 
facilitate technological development. These enabling conditions 













b. The enabling conditions 
 
1. Improving the manufacturing firms access to foreign  
   technologies   
 
Like other developing countries, Indonesia is a net importer of 
advanced technologies developed in the advanced industrial 
countries. These advanced technologies are crucial to enhance a 
country’s technological capabilities to produce more efficiently 
and competitively. The experience of Japan and the East Asian 
NIEs, particularly Korea and Taiwan, has shown that the 
acquisition of foreign technologies, the assimilation and 
adaptation of these technologies to local conditions, and the 
subsequent improvement of these imported technologies have been 
crucial to raising these countries’ technological capabilities.   
Hence, the international transfer of technology has been an 
important source of technical progress in these countries (Chen 
1983: 63).  
 
In view of the economic importance of these imported technologies, 
it is important to identify the major channels through which 
these technologies have been transferred to Indonesia, 
particularly to its manufacturing sector. Several studies on 
international technology transfer in Indonesia’s manufacturing 
sector indicate that foreign direct investment (FDI), technical 
licensing agreements, capital goods imports and the related 
transfer of skills by technical experts of foreign supplier firms, 
and technical and marketing assistance by foreign buyers of some 
of Indonesia’s manufactured exports, have been the major channels 
for international technology transfer to Indonesia.  While 
several firms have obtained technical and managerial 
consultancies from foreign experts, no reliable data are 
available on these consultancies (Thee, 2005).  
 
These major channels will be discussed below. 
 
 
i.  Foreign direct investment (FDI)  
 
While Indonesia since the mid-1980s through 1996 experienced 
sizable net FDI inflows, after the onset of the Asian economic 
crisis it experienced net FDI outflows which has persisted 
through 2003 (Table 4). Even the positive net FDI inflow in 2004 











1980s through 1996. This positive figure was also caused by the 
fact that Bank Indonesia has recently included privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), specifically the sale of these 
SOEs to foreign investors, and bank restructuring, specifically 
the sale of distressed banks to foreign investors, as part of FDI 
inflows.   
 
The lack of interest of foreign investors to undertake new 
Greenfield investments after the Asian economic crisis can be 
attributed to Indonesia’s poor investment climate, which 
currently ranks among the worst in the East Asian region.   
Various factors account for this poor investment climate, 
including the lack of legal certainty,  labour problems, mainly 
caused by a business-unfriendly labour law, confusion caused by 
the regional autonomy introduced in early 2001, widespread 
corruption, and crumbling physical infrastructure and traffic 
congestion from the plants to the harbour. The net effect of 
these problems is uncertainty, higher costs and many demands for 
bribes (MacIntyre & Resosudarmo, 2003:  146;  World Bank, 2003: 
29).   
 
 
Table 4   Net FDI in- and outflows into and out of Indonesia,  
                           1986-2004                                
Year         Net FDI in- and outflows 
                   (millions of US$)  
 
1986                    258               
1987                    385  
1988                    576     
1989                    682 
1990                     1,093   
1991                   1,482  
1992                1,777  
1993                2,004    
1994                2,109 
1995                4,346 
1996                6,194 
1997                4,667 
1998               - 356 
1999               -2,745  
2000               -4,550  
2001               -2,977 











2003                - 597    
           2004                      1,046  
________________________________________________________________  
                 
Note:   Revised net FDI inflows include privatisation of 
        state-owned enterprises (SOEs), specifically to 
        non-residents,and banking restructuring, 
        specifically the sale of bank assets to foreign 
        investors. 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia: Indonesian Financial 
        Statistics, successive issues through 
        February 2005. 
 
 
The fact that a small amount of FDI only flowed into the country  
since 2004, while Korea and Thailand, the two other East Asian 
countries worst affected by the Asian economic crisis, already 
flowed into these two countries since 1999 meant that these 
countries experienced not only a strengthening of their 
currencies, but also an accelerated of much needed corporate   
restructuring, and important infusions of new technologies and 
modern management methods (World Bank, 2000: 6). Indonesia, on 
the other hand, was much less able to obtain these benefit, as 
FDI instead flowed out of the country.                  
  
                           .    
ii. Technical licensing agreements 
 
In Indonesia a major 'unpackaged' (non-equity) mode of technology 
transfer from advanced country firms to Indonesian firms has been 
technical licensing agreements (TLAs). Although no quantitative 
data are available on the number of these TLAs, circumstantial 
evidence indicates that these TLAs often involve the transfer of 
older and mature technologies that do not offer the recipient 
country a long-term competitive advantage in the global market 
(Marks 1999: 6).  However, for a late-industrialising economy 
like Indonesia, acquiring and mastering these older technologies 
first is a good way to develop the important basic industrial 
technological capabilities (ITCs), namely the production, 
investment and adaptive capabilities.   
       
 
iii.  Imports of capital goods and the transfer of skills by 












Imports of capital goods provide another way of acquiring the 
means of production without the transactional costs involved in 
FDI or TLAs (Dahlman, Ross-Larson & Westphal 1987: 768).  Capital 
goods imports are actually embodied technology flows entering a 
country. They introduce into the production processes new 
machinery, other capital equipment and components that 
incorporate technologies which do not necessarily incorporate 
high or frontier technologies, but are nevertheless new to the 
recipient firm (Soesastro 1998: 304).   
 
These imported capital goods can be a cheap way of developing 
local TCs if they can be used as models for reverse engineering 
to produce the machines locally (Dahlman, Ross-Larson & Westphal 
1987: 768). However, Indonesian firms have in general not engaged 
in ‘reverse engineering’ on a large scale to develop their ITCs.  
  
Historically, there has been a close association between capital 
investment in Indonesia and the import of capital goods. This 
close association is caused by the fact that Indonesia's capital 
goods industry is still relatively small and backward, not only 
compared to the other large Asian countries, such as China and 
India, but even compared to Malaysia. (World Bank 1994:  26-27). 
As a result, the bulk of capital goods required in production 
processes still needs to be imported.   
 
   
iv. Technical assistance by foreign buyers  
 
Since the mid 1970s an important informal channel of 
international technology transfer for Indonesian firms, including 
small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs), has been provided by 
their participation in world trade, specifically through 
exporting their products.  This informal channel was utilised 
effectively by local firms, particularly electronics firms, in 
the four East Asian NIEs, including Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore which, based on low wage rates, were able to build up 
basic operational (production) capabilities through simple 
assembly of mature products for exports, often developed through 
technical assistance provided by foreign buyers (Hobday, 1994: 
335; World Bank 1996: 4).  These local NIE firms successfully 
coupled export and technological development, allowing export 
market needs (the needs and design and product specifications of 
their overseas buyers) to focus their investment in technological 











technologies from their overseas buyers. This process of coupling 
exports with technology development was called 'export-led 
technology development' (Hobday, 1994: 335).    
 
Although not as technologically advanced as the East Asian   
NIEs’s ‘export-led technology development’, the remarkable export 
performance which the garment industry and other export 
industries in Bali and Jepara, Indonesia, have experienced since 
the mid-1970s is somewhat similar to the experience of these East 
Asian firms.  The remarkable growth of Bali's  export industries, 
starting with the garments industry in the mid-1970s, and 
subsequently the silver jewelry, wood carving, quilting, leather 
products, bamboo furniture, ceramics, and stone carving 
industries, was based on vital information flows which these 
Balinese firms, received through strategic business alliances 
with foreign firms and businessmen (Cole 1998: 257). 
 
Through the vital information transfer and technical and 
managerial assistance (for instance in plant lay-out, advice on 
the purchase of the most appropriate machines), including strict 
quality control, provided by the foreign buyers (who often acted 
also as technical consultants) to the largely small Balinese 
firms, these firms were able to achieve high levels of efficiency 
and accuracy. This assistance was provided on a for-profit basis, 
as it was specifically tied to tangible product output results 
(Cole 1998: 275; Thee & Hamid 1997). The ongoing interaction of 
these two parties started a virtuous cycle of technological 
improvements and learning that was self-replicating and largely 
self-financing, which led to rapid and sustained export growth 
(Cole 1998: 275).  
 
 
2.  The availability of finance for technology development 
 
Another important element of industrial technology development is 
the availability and access to finance. The availability and 
access to term finance for investments in technology upgrading 
would be facilitated if the capacity of the banking system to 
appraise such investments could be strengthened. In Indonesia   
the government during the late Soeharto era also attempted to 
improve the tax treatment of venture capital funds (World Bank, 
1996: iv). 
 
Unfortunately, even before the Asian economic crisis, finance for 
investments in technology development was scarce. Indonesia never 











namely the Korea Technology Development Corporation (KCTC) (World 
Bank, 1996: 29). There was a state-owned venture capital firm, 
the PT Bahana Pembinaan Usaha Indonesia (Bahana PUI), but this 
venture capital firm was mainly entrusted to guide and 
development small-and medium enterprises (SMEs) (FIAS: 1996: 54). 
   
 
After surviving banks had recovered from the Asian economic 
crisis, the bulk of their loans has been provided for private 
consumption, which indeed has been the main driver of economic 
growth during the past few years. At present banks and non-
financial institutions have provided large amounts of loans for 
housing loans and credit card lending.  In fact, bank consumer 
credit has been growing rapidly since 2000, and in 2004 grew at 
an average year-on-year rate of over 30 per cent (Soesastro & 
Atje, 2005: 35). Under these conditions little is left to finance 
technology development, even if banks were willing to overcome 
their risk aversion.  Under these conditions, it is not 
surprising that the bulk of R&D activities in the manufacturing 
sector is financed by the private firms themselves (Table 5). 
 
 
Table 5   Spending on R & D in Indonesian manufacturing by source 
                    of funds, 1994 and 1999 
                      (billions of rupiah) 
 




   38.79 
 
   0.68 
Other firms     27.56     1.04 
Own firm    159.61    228.92 
Overseas     17.59       7.57    
Other      1.29     9.52  
 
Source: LIPI and Office of the Minister of State for Research and 
        Technology, 2004, based on surveys by the Central Agency  
       for Statistics, held in 1994 and 1999. 
 
The above date show that even before the Asian economic crisis, 
the bulk of R & D funding was financed by the manufacturing 
themselves. After the crisis both in absolute and relative terms,  
R & D funding by the firms themselves became even more important 
 
 












To assist firms to improve their technological capabilities, 
effective technology support services are needed.  These 
technology support services include effective metrology, 
standards, testing and quality support services (MSTQ services). 
These services include the dissemination of information on 
international standards and assistance to firms to get ISO 9000 
certification.  It also includes industrial extension services to 
assist firms to improve productivity, quality, product designs 
and delivery times.  Other important technology support services 
include technology information services to provide firms with 
information on best practice, that is globally competitive 
technologies (World Bank, 1996: v).     
    
During the Soeharto era the performance of the available 
technology support services, particularly the MSTQ services, was 
rated as inadequate by many firms. To some extent this was caused 
by the fact that many firms did not realise that their products 
needed to conform to strict standards (e.g. technical and 
sanitary standards) and performance requirements (e.g. ISO 9000), 
both national and international, particularly if they wanted to 
enter export markets (Thee, 1998: 127). 
 
The available technology support services, including the 
important MSTQ services, are public institutes. If these services 
were rated as inadequate before the Asian economic crisis, the 
range and quality of these public institutes have likely declined 
further after the crisis, as public funds to upgrade these 
services have been reduced. It has been suggested that these 
technology support services should be privatised, but it appears 
unlikely that at present the private sector would be willing to 





The above overview of the basic and enabling condition which would 
encourage firms to invest in industrial technological development 
have in general not been met in Indonesia, safe for the sustained 
adherence to sound macro economic policies. During the late 
Soeharto era (1985-1996) pro-competition policies were introduced, 
particularly the liberalisation of the trade and the foreign 
investment regime. After the fall of Soeharto in 1998 bans on 
various restrictions on domestic competition and trade  introduced, 











March 1999. Unfortunately,  these pro-competition policies have 
recently been undermined by new restrictions on domestic 
competition and trade introduced by various regional governments 
after the introduction of regional autonomy in early 2001.       
 
Human resource development in Indonesia has generally lagged 
behind its East Asian neighbours before the Asian economic crisis, 
and have lagged even farther behind after the Asian economic 
crisis. Technical education at the secondary and tertiary level 
have been inadequate in imparting to the students the necessary 
technical skills to improve industrial technological development. 
 
Indonesian firms have access to foreign technologies mainly 
through foreign direct investment (FDI), technical licensing 
agreements, capital goods imports, and exporting. However, in the 
past Indonesia has not been able to take sufficient advantage 
from the presence of foreign firms to promote industrial and 
technological upgrading. At present the lack of interest of 
foreign investors to invest in Indonesia because of the country’s 
poor investment climate has prevented Indonesia from benefiting 
from the infusions of new technologies and advanced management 
methods. Technical licensing agreements have been a good means to 
get access to foreign technologies, even though often these 
technologies are older, mature technologies. The import of 
capital goods has also been a good channel to get new embodied 
technology, the use of which can be enhanced by technical 
assistance provided by the foreign suppliers of these capital 
goods. Gaining access to new product designs, technologies and 
export markets through the advice and assistance of foreign 
buyers/consultants of Indonesian products has also been helpful 
to several exporting firms, including SMEs, in upgrading their 
technical performance. The downside of this development is the   
continuing reliance on foreign buyers/consultants for the 
introduction of new product designs, technologies, and access to 
foreign markets. 
 
Although finance for industrial technological development is 
important to firms willing to invest in this development, the 
performance of the financial sector in providing loans to firms 
willing to invest in technology development was disappointing 
before the Asian economic crisis. After the crisis the prospects 
for getting more finance from the financial sector have become 
worse, as risk-averse banks prefer to provide loans for 












To assist firms to improve their technological capabilities, 
effective technology support services are needed.  These 
technology support services include effective metrology, 
standards, testing and quality support services (MSTQ services) 
as well services disseminating of information on international 
standards and best practice technologies and providing assistance 
to firms to get ISO 9000 certification. It also includes 
industrial extension services to assist firms to improve 
productivity, quality, product designs and delivery times. 
    
The available technology support services, including the 
important MSTQ services, are public institutes. If these services 
were rated as inadequate before the Asian economic crisis, the 
range and quality of these public institutes have likely declined 
further after the crisis, as public funds to upgrade these 
services have been reduced. For this reason some people have 
suggested privatise these technology support services.  However, 
it appears unlikely that at present the private sector would be 
interested in running these services themselves. 
 
The above overview of the state of basic and enabling conditions 
for industrial technology development in Indonesia indicates that 
in general these important conditions have not been met during 
the Soeharto era, and even less so after the Asian economic 
crisis. The Indonesian government will therefore have to focus 
its industrial ands technology policies on attempting to meet the 
above conditions for industrial technological development, if it 
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